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Abstract
The Machina thought experiments pose to major non-expected utility models challenges that are similar
to those posed by the Ellsberg thought experiments to subjective expected utility theory (SEUT). We
test human choices in the ‘Ellsberg three-color example’, confirming typical ambiguity aversion patterns,
and the ‘Machina 50/51 and reflection examples’, partially confirming the preferences hypothesized by
Machina. Then, we show that a quantum-theoretic framework for decision-making under uncertainty
recently elaborated by some of us allows faithful modeling of all data on the Ellsberg and Machina
paradox situations. In the quantum-theoretic framework subjective probabilities are represented by
quantum probabilities, while quantum state transformations enable representations of ambiguity aversion
and subjective attitudes toward it.
Keywords: Expected utility theory; ambiguity aversion; Machina paradox; quantum structures; quantum
probability.
1 Introduction
Probability theorists distinguish between probabilities that are known or knowable in principle (‘objective
probabilities’) and probabilities that are not known or knowable. For this reason, the term ‘risk’ is generally
used to designate uncertainty situations that can be described by objective probabilities, while the term
‘ambiguity’ to designate uncertainty situations that cannot be described by objective probabilities (Knight
1921). The so-called ‘Bayesian paradigm’ minimizes this distinction by introducing the notion of ‘subjective
probability’: when probabilities are not known, people form their own ‘beliefs’ or ‘priors’ (Gilboa et al.
2008). Savage’s ‘subjective expected utility theory’ (SEUT), then, extends ‘objective EUT’ (von Neumann
and Morgenstern 1944) within the Bayesian paradigm (Savage 1954). Savage identified a set of axioms
allowing to uniquely represent human preferences by expected utility maximization for a unique subjective
probability measure satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability theory (‘Kolmogorovian probability’)
(Kolmogorov 1933).
In a seminal 1961 paper, Daniel Ellsberg presented a set of examples which show that human decisions
violate one of the axioms of SEUT, namely, the ‘sure-thing principle’ (Ellsberg 1961). More specifically,
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people generally prefer to bet on events with objective probability, rather than on events with subjec-
tive probability. And, several decision-making experiments have confirmed this phenomenon known since
Ellsberg as ‘ambiguity aversion’ (Camerer and Weber 1992), (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014).
The ‘Ellsberg paradox’ led many scholars to rethink the foundations of SEUT and to formulate more
general decision-making models which could represent subjective probabilities, ambiguity and subjective
attitudes toward it. In this respect, the major ‘non-expected utility models’ include, but are not limited
to, ‘Choquet expected utility’ (Schmeidler 1989), ‘cumulative prospect theory’ (Tversky and Kahneman
1992), ‘maxmin expected utility’ (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2008), ‘α-maxmin expected utility’ (Ghirardato
et al. 1995), ‘variational preferences’ (Maccheroni et al. 2006a) and ‘smooth ambiguity preferences’
(Klibanoff et al. 2005) (see, e.g., (Gilboa and Marinacci 2013) and (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014) for
extensive reviews).
More recently, Mark Machina presented two Ellsberg-like examples, the ‘50/51 example’ and the ‘re-
flection example’, which pose to the above non-expected utility models difficulties that are similar to the
difficulties posed by the Ellsberg paradox to SEUT (Machina 2009), (Baillon et al. 2011). In particular,
the ‘Machina paradox’ violates the ‘tail-separability property’ of Choquet expected utility. The reflection
example was tested in a decision-making experiment (L’Haridon and Placido 2010), confirming ‘Machina
preferences’ against tail-separability, while the 50/51 example has not been tested yet, at the best of our
knowledge (Section 2).
We took a different direction to decision-making under uncertainty, which rests on a successful imple-
mentation of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, in particular, quantum probability, to model
cognitive phenomena that have resisted traditional modeling in terms of Kolmogorovian probability, e.g.,
‘conjunctive and disjunctive fallacies’, ‘question order effects’, ‘over- and under-extension in membership
and typicality judgments’ and ‘disjunction effect’ (Aerts 2009), (Aerts et al. 2013a), (Aerts et al. 2013b),
(Busemeyer et al. 2011), (Busemeyer and Bruza 2012), (Haven and Khrennikov 2013), (Pothos and
Busemeyer 2013), (Wang et al. 2014). According to this approach, in any decision process a contextual
interaction occurs between the decision-maker and the cognitive situation (the ‘decision-making (DM) en-
tity’) that is the object itself of the decision. As a consequence of this contextual interaction, the state of
the DM entity may change. This led us to develop a quantum-based state-dependent theoretic framework,
able to model human preferences in the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations, and to represent concrete
human decisions in the three-color Ellsberg experiment and the Machina reflection experiment (Aerts et
al. 2014), (Aerts and Sozzo 2016), (Aerts et al. 2017) (Section 4).
In the present paper, we proceed further in this direction and report the results of various decision-
making experiments that we performed in situations where ambiguity is present. We firstly performed the
‘Ellsberg three-color experiment’, confirming the typical ambiguity aversion pattern that is reported in the
experimental literature. Next, we performed the Machina 50/51 and reflection experiments. While the
50/51 experiment confirms the preferences hypothesized by Machina, showing an inversion of preferences
incompatible with the predictions of non-expected utility models, the reflection example does not confirm
the findings in (L’Haridon and Placido 2010) and identifies a pattern of preferences that partially agree
with existing theoretical proposals (Section 3).
Then, we show that the experimental data in Section 3 can be faithfully represented within the above
mentioned quantum-theoretic framework in which subjective probabilities are represented by quantum
probabilities, while the state of the DM entity and its transformations in a decision-making process allow
to represent ambiguity and individual preferences toward it (Section 4). These results are compatible
with some recent approaches that use the mathematical formalism of quantum theory to specifically model
decision-making processes, namely, La Mura’s modeling of the Allais (Allais 1953) and Ellsberg paradoxes
(La Mura 2009), and Khrennikov’s extension of the Aumann theorem (Khrennikov 2015).
We conclude the paper with some general considerations which agree with the conclusions in (Machina
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1/3 2/3
Act Red Yellow Black
f1 $100 $0 $0
f2 $0 $0 $100
f3 $100 $100 $0
f4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the Ellsberg three-color thought experiment.
2009) on the issues of ‘event-separability properties’, like those stated by the sure-thing principle and
tail-separability, in concrete human decisions (Section 5).
2 Expected utility theory, Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes
The basic mathematical framework of SEUT and its major extensions requires a set S of (physical)
‘states of nature’, a σ-algebra A ⊆ P(S ) of subsets of S , called ‘events’, and a subjective probability
measure p : A ⊆ P(S ) −→ [0, 1] over A . Let X be the set of all ‘consequences’. An ‘act’ is a function
f : S −→X mapping states into consequences. Next, we introduce a ‘weak preference relation’ (reflexive,
symmetric and transitive) % over the Cartesian product F × F , where F is the set of all acts and 
and ∼ respectively denote ‘strong preference’ and ‘indifference’. Let finally u : X −→ < be a strictly
increasing and continuous ‘utility function’ mapping consequences into real numbers and expressing the
decision-maker’s taste.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the set S is discrete and finite, and X consists of monetary
payoffs. Let {E1, E2, . . . , En} be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events, forming a
partition of S . And, let f be the act that, for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, associates the event Ei with the
consequence xi ∈ <, so that f can be written as f = (E1, x1;E2, x2; . . . ;En, xn). Under SEUT, f can
be represented as the ‘expected utility functional’ W (f) = W (E1, x1;E2, x2; . . . ;En, xn) =
∑n
i=1 piu(xi)
where, for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, pi = p(Ei) is interpreted as the ‘subjective probability’ that the event Ei
occurs, and expresses the decision-maker’s beliefs.
Let now f and g be two acts, and let W (f) and W (g) be the corresponding expected utilities. Then,
Savage proved that, if suitable axioms are satisfied, including the sure-thing principle, one has f % g if and
only if W (f) ≥W (g) (Savage 1954). We stress that the utility function u is unique (up to positive affine
transformations), and the subjective probability distribution p, which is defined over a single σ-algebra A
of events, is unique and satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorovian probability theory (Kolmogorov 1933).
In 1961, Daniel Ellsberg proved in a series of thought experiments that decision-makers generally prefer
acts with known (or objective) probabilities to acts with unknown (or subjective) probabilities. Let us, for
example, consider the ‘Ellsberg three-color example’, that is, one urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls that
are either yellow or black in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then,
free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1. Ellsberg suggested
that, when asked to rank these acts, most people will prefer f1 over f2 and f4 over f3. Indeed, acts f1
and f4 are ‘unambiguous’, because they are associated with events over known probabilities, and hence
provide ‘clear information’. On the contrary, acts f2 and f3 are ‘ambiguous’, because they are associated
with events over unknown probabilities. This attitude of decision-makers is known as ‘ambiguity aversion’
(Ellsberg 1961). Several experiments have confirmed the ‘Ellsberg preferences’ f1  f2 and f4  f3, hence
ambiguity aversion (see, e.g., (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014)), and only Slovic and Tversky (1974) found
‘ambiguity attraction’.
3
50/101 51/101
Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $202 $202 $101 $101
f2 $202 $101 $202 $101
f3 $303 $202 $101 $0
f4 $303 $101 $202 $0
Table 2. The payoff matrix for the Machina 50/51 example.
Preferences of decision-makers who are sensitive to ambiguity cannot be explained within SEUT, be-
cause they violate the sure-thing principle, according to which, preferences should be independent of the
common outcome. In the Ellsberg three-color urn, preferences should not depend on whether the common
event “a yellow ball is drawn” pays off $0 or $100. More concretely, SEUT predicts ‘consistency of decision-
makers’ preferences’, that is, f1 % f2 if and only if f3 % f4. A simple calculation shows indeed that it is
impossible to assign subjective probabilities pR =
1
3 , pY and pB =
2
3 − pY such that W (f1) > W (f2) and
W (f4) > W (f3).
Several extensions of SEUT have been put forward, mainly in an axiomatic form, which cope with the
‘Ellsberg paradox’, replacing the sure-thing principle by weaker axioms and representing subjective prob-
abilities by more general, possibly non-Kolmogorovian, mathematical structures. Major proposals include
‘Choquet expected utility’ (Schmeidler 1989), ‘cumulative prospect theory’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1992),
‘maxmin expected utility’ (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2008), ‘α-maxmin expected utility’ (Ghirardato et al.
1995), ‘variational preferences’ (Maccheroni et al. 2006a) and ‘smooth ambiguity preferences’ (Klibanoff
et al. 2005) (see, e.g., the reviews in (Gilboa and Marinacci 2013) and (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014)).
In 2009, Mark Machina presented two thought experiments, the ‘50/51 example’ and the ‘reflection
example’, which challenge the non-expected utility models above in a similar way as the Ellsberg paradox
challenges SEUT (Machina 2009), (Baillon et al. 2011).
Let us consider the Machina 50/51 example and formulate it in a way that is suitable for our purposes.
One urn contains 50 balls that are either red or yellow in unknown proportion and 51 balls that are either
black or green in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then, free of
charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 2. For every i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}, let
Ei be the elementary event “a ball of color i is drawn from the urn”. Clearly, all Eis are ambiguous events,
while the event “a red or yellow ball is drawn” has an objective probability 50101 and the event “a black or
green ball is drawn” has an objective probability 51101 . As such, the act f1 in Table 2 is unambiguous, while
the acts f2, f3 and f4 in the same table are ambiguous. On the other hand, the acts f2 and f4 benefit from
the Bayesian advantage offered by the 51st ball yielding 202. Hence, an ambiguity averse decision-maker
may prefer f1 over f2 and may be indifferent between f3 and f4. On the contrary, an expected utility
maximizer assuming a uniform distribution over the balls will prefer f2 and f4. As argued in (Machina
2009) and (Baillon et al. 2011), the ‘informational advantage’ of f1 can more than offset its Bayesian
advantage with respect to f2, while f3 does not offer any clear informational advantage with respect to f4.
This leads to the ‘Machina preferences’ f1  f2 and f4  f3. (Machina 2009) and (Baillon et al. 2011)
showed that none of the non-expected utility models above can reproduce this pattern, because they all
predict f1  f2 if and only if f3  f4. In other words, none of these models above can represent preferences
revealing this trade-off between ambiguity aversion and Bayesian advantage.
Let us come to the Machina reflection example ‘with lower tail shifts’. Consider one urn with 20 balls,
10 are either red or yellow in unknown proportion, 10 are either black or green in unknown proportion.
One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one
of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 3. In this case, all the events “a ball of color i is drawn from the
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1/2 1/2
Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $0 $50 $25 $25
f2 $0 $25 $50 $25
f3 $25 $50 $25 $0
f4 $25 $25 $50 $0
Table 3. The payoff matrix for the Machina reflection example with lower tail shifts.
1/2 1/2
Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $50 $50 $25 $75
f2 $50 $25 $50 $75
f3 $75 $50 $25 $50
f4 $75 $25 $50 $50
Table 4. The payoff matrix for the Machina reflection example with upper tail shifts.
urn”, i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}, are ambiguous. In this respect, Machina introduced the notion of ‘informational
symmetry’, namely, the events “the drawn ball is red or yellow” and “the drawn ball is black or green”
have known probability equal to 12 and, further, the ambiguity about the distribution of colors is similar
in the two events. A decision-maker who is sensitive to informational symmetry, will then prefer act f1
over act f2 and act f4 over act f3, or act f2 over act f1 and act f3 over act f4, while an expected utility
maximizer assuming a uniform distribution over the balls will be indifferent between the four acts, as they
have the same expected utility. (Machina 2009) and (Baillon et al. 2011) showed that, according to the
non-expected utility models above, f1 % f2 if and only if f3 % f4 and a decision-maker who is sensitive to
informational symmetry should exhibit f1 ∼ f2 and f3 ∼ f4.
Let us finally consider the Machina reflection example ‘with upper tail shifts’. One urn contains 20 balls,
10 are either red or yellow in unknown proportion, 10 are either black or green in unknown proportion.
One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one
of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 defined in Table 4. According to Machina’s informational symmetry, people
should again prefer act f1 over act f2 (act f2 over act f1) and act f4 over act f3 (act f3 over act f4). On
the other hand, the non-expected utility models above predict that f1 % f2 if and only if f3 % f4, and a
decision-maker who is sensitive to informational symmetry should exhibit f1 ∼ f2 and f3 ∼ f4 (Machina
2009), (Baillon et al. 2011).
A decision-making experiment performed by L’Haridon and Placido (2010) confirmed the ‘Machina
preferences’ f1  f2 and f4  f3, consistently with an informational symmetry scenario. These authors
found that the ‘tail-separability property’ is specifically violated in non-expected utility models with rank-
dependent utility, like Choquet expected utility and cumulative prospect theory.
The immediate consequence is that representing Machina preferences needs a completely new theoretical
approach to ambiguity and subjective attitudes toward it (L’Haridon and Placido 2010).
3 Analyzing the experiments
We investigated the Ellsberg three-color, the 50/51 and the reflection examples collecting data in a decision-
making experiment on human participants. The present section is devoted to analyze the results and draw
relevant conclusions.
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Figure 1. A sample of the questionnaire related to the decision-making experiment on the Ellsberg
three-color urn: choice between acts f1 and f2 in Table 1.
We asked 200 people, chosen among colleagues and friends, to fill a questionnaire in which they had to
rank acts according to Tables 1–4 in a within subjects experimental setup. People had on average a basic
knowledge of probability theory, but no training in decision theory.1
In the first experiment, we tested the Ellsberg three-color example. Participants were provided with a
paper similar to the one in Figure 1, in which they had to choose between acts f1 and f2 and, then, between
acts f3 and f4 in Table 1, Section 2. For the sake of simplicity, we assumed that each choice concerned two
alternatives, hence indifference between acts was not a possible option. Overall, 125 participants preferred
acts f1 and f4, 38 preferred acts f1 and f3, 6 preferred acts f2 and f3, and 31 preferred acts f2 and
f4, as summarized in Table 5. This means that 163 participants over 200 preferred act f1 over act f2.
This difference is significant (p-value=1.25 · 10−23) and entails a ‘preference weight’ of 0.815. Further, 156
participants over 200 preferred act f4 over act f3. This difference is also significant (p-value=5.48 · 10−18)
and entails a ‘preference weight’ of 0.780. The inversion rate is 0.655. Finally, a significant difference
in the choices f1f2 and f3f4 was observed (p-value=1.91 · 10−35). This pattern agrees with the Ellsberg
preferences and points toward ambiguity aversion, while it cannot be reproduced within SEUT. In addition,
these results confirm empirical findings existing in the literature (see, e.g., (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014)).
In the second experiment, we tested the Machina 50/51 example. Participants were provided with a
paper in which they had to choose between acts f1 and f2 and between acts f3 and f4 in Table 2, Section
2. Overall, 59 participants preferred acts f1 and f4, 57 preferred acts f1 and f3, 17 preferred acts f2
and f3, and 67 preferred acts f2 and f4, as summarized in Table 5. This means that 116 participants
over 200 preferred act f1 over act f2. This difference is significant (p-value=2.33 · 10−2) and entails a
‘preference weight’ of 0.580. Further, 126 participants over 200 preferred act f4 over act f3. This difference
is also significant (p-value=1.93 · 10−4) and entails a preference weight of 0.630. The inversion rate is
1The experimental study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the ’University of Leicester Code of
Practice and Research Code of Conduct, Research Ethics Committee of the School of Management’ with written informed
consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
6
Experiment (N=200) f1f4 f1f3 f2f3 f2f4
Three-color example 125 38 6 31
50/51 example 59 57 17 67
Reflection example lower t. s. 64 51 59 26
Reflection example upper t. s. 80 54 50 16
Table 5. Number of participants who preferred acts fi and fj , i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {3, 4}, in each experiment.
0.380. Finally, a significant difference in the choices f1f2 and f3f4 was observed (p-value=7.48 · 10−7).
This pattern agrees with the Machina preferences in Section 2, and can be explained within a trade-off
between ambiguity aversion and Bayesian advantage, while it cannot be reproduced either within SEUT
or its non-expetcted utility extensions.
The situation is more subtle for what concerns the reflection examples, whose experimental findings
are reported in the following.
In the third experiment, we tested the Machina reflection example with lower tail shifts. Participants
were provided with a paper in which they had to choose between acts f1 and f2 and between acts f3 and
f4 in Table 3, Section 2. Overall, 64 participants preferred acts f1 and f4, 51 preferred acts f1 and f3,
59 preferred acts f2 and f3, and 26 preferred acts f2 and f4, as summarized in Table 5. This means that
115 participants over 200 preferred act f1 over act f2. This difference is significant (p-value=3.36 · 10−2)
and entails a ‘preference weight’ of 0.575. Further, 120 participants over 200 preferred act f3 over act
f4. This difference is not significant (p-value=1.58 · 10−1), which can be interpreted by assuming that
decision-makers were on average indifferent between f3 and f4. The preference weight is 0.630, in this
case. The inversion rate is 0.615. Finally, a not significant difference in the choices f1f2 and f3f4 was
observed (p-value=0.6533). The result of the Machina reflection experiment with lower tail shifts does
not agree with the empirical findings in (L’Haridon and Placido 2010), who found agreement with the
Machina preferences in Section 2. Here, we have instead that act f1 is on average preferred over act f2,
while the decision-makers are on average indifferent between acts f3 and f4. This behavior shows that
decision-makers are not sensible to informational symmetry, while it may be compatible in particular with
Choquet expected utility.
In the fourth experiment, we tested the Machina reflection example with upper tail shifts. Participants
were provided with a paper in which they had to choose between acts f1 and f2 and between acts f3 and
f4 in Table 4, Section 2. Overall, 80 participants preferred acts f1 and f4, 54 preferred acts f1 and f3,
50 preferred acts f2 and f3, and 16 preferred acts f2 and f4, as summarized in Table 5. This means that
134 participants over 200 preferred act f1 over act f2. This difference is significant (p-value=7.89 · 10−7)
and entails a ‘preference weight’ of 0.670. Further, 104 participants over 200 preferred act f3 over act
f4. This difference is not significant (p-value=5.73 · 10−1), which can be interpreted by assuming that
decision-makers were on average indifferent between f3 and f4. The preference weight is 0.620, in this
case. The inversion rate is 0.650. Finally, a significant difference in the choices f1f2 and f3f4 was observed
(p-value=8.18 · 10−3). Also in this case, the result of the Machina reflection experiment with upper tail
shifts does not agree with the empirical findings in (L’Haridon and Placido 2010), who found agreement
with the Machina preferences in Section 2. Here, we have instead that act f1 is on average preferred over
act f2, while the decision-makers are on average indifferent between acts f3 and f4. This behavior shows
that decision-makers are not sensible to informational symmetry, while it may be compatible in particular
with Choquet expected utility.
As we can see, the experimental tests on the Machina reflection examples do not confirm the experi-
mental pattern found in (L’Haridon and Placido 2010), while the overall experimental findings cannot be
explained within a unique theoretical proposal within the ones sketched in Section 2.
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We will show in the next sections that all the results above can instead be modeled within a quantum-
theoretic framework elaborated by some of us (Aerts and Sozzo 2016), (Aerts et al. 2017). But, before
proceeding further, we need to recall the essentials of such quantum-theoretic framework.
4 A quantum-theoretic framework to model human decisions
We present in this section a unified framework to model events, states, subjective probabilities, acts,
preferences and decisions within the quantum formalism sketched in A. The quantum-theoretic framework
was firstly presented in (Aerts and Sozzo 2016) and then developed in (Aerts et al. 2017), and is a first
step toward the elaboration of ‘state-dependent EUT’ where subjective probabilities are represented by
quantum probabilities.
We firstly introduce some basic notions and definitions that are needed to operationally characterize
the cognitive aspects of human decisions under uncertainty.
(i) The cognitive situation that is the object of the decision identifies a DM entity in a defined state pv.
We denote by ΣDM the set of all possible states of the DM entity. This state has a cognitive nature, hence it
should be distinguished from a physical state (state of nature). The cognitive state captures mathematical
aspects of ambiguity.
(ii) A contextual interaction of a cognitive, not physical, nature occurs between the decision-maker and
the DM entity. This contextual interaction may determine a change of state of the DM entity.
(iii) The type of state change of the DM entity induced by the contextual interaction with the decision-
maker gives information on the decision-maker’s attitudes toward ambiguity (ambiguity aversion, ambiguity
attraction, etc.).
(iv) Events are related to measurements that can be performed on the DM entity. For each state pv of
the DM entity, each event E is associated with a probability µv(E) that E occurs when the DM entity is
in the state pv.
(v) The DM entity, its states, events, probabilities and the decision-making process are modeled by
using the formalism of quantum theory in A. In particular, the state of the DM entity identifies a single
quantum probability distribution via Born’s rule. We interpret this quantum probability distribution,
which is generally non-Kolmogorovian, as the subjective probability distribution associated with the specific
decision process.
Let us assume, as in Section 2, that the set S of states of nature is discrete and finite, and let
{E1, E2, . . . , En} be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events. Let X be the set of
consequences, which denote monetary outcomes. An act is a function f : S −→ X , and F is the set of
all acts. If the act f maps the event Ei into the outcome xi ∈ <, we can write f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn).
We assume that a utility function u : X −→ < exists over the set of consequences which incorporates
individual preferences toward risk.
We refer to the quantum mathematics in A. The DM entity is associated with a Hilbert space H over
the field C of complex numbers. Since n is the number of elementary events, the space H can be chosen
to be isomorphic to the Hilbert space Cn of n-tuples of complex numbers. Let {|α1〉, |α2〉, . . . , |αn〉} be the
canonical orthonormal (ON) basis of Cn, that is, |α1〉 = (1, 0, . . . 0), . . . , |αn〉 = (0, 0, . . . n). The event Ei
is then represented by the orthogonal projection operator Pi = |αi〉〈αi|, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
For every state pv ∈ ΣDM of the DM entity, represented by the unit vector |v〉 =
∑n
i=1〈αi|v〉|αi〉 ∈ Cn,
the quantum probability distribution
µv : P ∈ L (Cn) 7−→ µv(P ) ∈ [0, 1] (1)
(L (Cn) is the lattice of all orthogonal projection operators over the complex Hilbert space Cn) induced by
Born’s rule, represents the subjective probability that the event E, represented by the orthogonal projection
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operator P , occurs when the DM entity is in the state pv. Thus, in particular,
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈αi|v〉|2 (2)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Suppose that, when the decision-maker is presented with a choice between the acts f and g, the DM
entity is in the initial state pv0 . This state is interpreted as the state of the DM entity when no cognitive
context is present. As the decision-maker starts pondering between f and g, this mental action can be
described as a cognitive context interacting with the DM entity and changing its state. The type of state
change directly depends on the decision-maker’s attitude toward ambiguity. More precisely, if the DM
entity is in the initial state pv0 and the decision-maker is asked to choose between the acts f and g, a given
attitude toward ambiguity, say ambiguity aversion, will determine a given change of state of the DM entity
to a state pv, leading the decision-maker to prefer, say f to g. But, a different attitude toward ambiguity
will determine a different change of state of the DM entity to a state pw, leading the decision-maker to
prefer g to f . In this way, different attitudes toward ambiguity are formalized by different changes of state
inducing different subjective probabilities.
The considerations above suggest associating the DM entity with a ‘family of subjective probability
distributions’, represented by quantum probabilities {µv : L (Cn) −→ [0, 1]}pv∈ΣDM , and parametrized by
the state pv of the DM entity. In a concrete choice between two acts we will derive the exact state, hence
the specific subjective probability distribution that represents the actual choice.
Let us move on to the representation of acts. The act f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn) is represented by the
Hermitian operator
Fˆ =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pi =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)|αi〉〈αi| (3)
For every pv ∈ ΣDM , we introduce the functional ‘expected utility in the state pv’ Wv : F −→ < as follows.
For every f ∈ F ,
Wv(f) = 〈v|Fˆ |v〉 = 〈v|
( n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pi
)
|v〉
=
n∑
i=1
u(xi)〈v|Pi|v〉 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)|〈αi|v〉|2 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)µv(Ei) (4)
because of (2) and (3). Equation (4) generalizes the expected utility formula of SEUT. We note that the
expected utility explicitly depends on the state pv of the DM entity. This means that, for two acts f and g,
two states pv and pw may exist such that Wv(f) > Wv(g), but Ww(f) < Ww(g), depending on subjective
attitudes toward ambiguity. This suggests introducing a state-dependent preference relation %v on the set
of acts F , as follows.
For every f, g ∈ F , pv ∈ ΣDM ,
f %v g iff Wv(f) ≥Wv(g) (5)
It follows that the DM entity incorporates the presence of ambiguity, as the quantum probability distribu-
tion representing subjective probabilities depends on the state of the DM entity. Furthermore, the way in
which the state of the DM entity changes in the interaction with the decision-maker incorporates people’s
attitude toward ambiguity, as it determines the state-dependent preference relation %v.
The state-dependence enables the ‘inversion of preferences’ observed in the Ellsberg and Machina
paradox situations in Section 3, as we will show in the next sections.
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4.1 Application to the Ellsberg paradox
We show in this section that the quantum-theoretic framework presented in Section 4 can be successfully
applied to model the data collected on the Ellsberg three-color example in Section 3.
Referring to Section 4, the DM entity is the urn with 30 red balls and 60 yellow or black balls in
unknown proportion, which is assumed to be in a (cognitive) state pv. Let ER, EY and EB denote the
exhaustive and mutually exclusive elementary events “a red ball is drawn”, “a yellow ball is drawn” and
“a black ball is drawn”, respectively. The events define a ‘color measurement’ on the DM entity with three
outcomes, corresponding to the three colors red, yellow and black. The color measurement is represented by
a Hermitian operator with eigenvectors |R〉 = (1, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0), and |B〉 = (0, 0, 1) or, equivalently,
by the spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i| | i ∈ {R, Y,B}}. In other terms, the event Ei is represented by the
orthogonal projection operator Pi = |i〉〈i|, i ∈ {R, Y,B}. In the canonical basis of C3, a state pv of the
DM entity is instead represented by the unit vector
|v〉 =
∑
i∈{R,Y,B}
ρie
iθi |i〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB ) (6)
By using the Born’s rule of quantum probability in (2), the probability µv(Ei) of drawing a ball of color
i, i ∈ {R, Y,B}, when the DM entity is in a state pv, is given by
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (7)
We have ρ2R =
1
3 , as the urn contains 30 red balls. Hence, a state pv of the DM entity is represented by
the unit vector
|v〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY ,
√
2
3
− ρ2Y eiθB ) (8)
Since the DM entity is a cognitive entity, ‘cognitive contexts’ have an influence on its state, and will
generally determine a specific state change. This is what happens in the cognitive realm in analogy with
the physical realm, where a physical context will in general change the physical state of a physical entity.
Hence, whenever a decision-maker is asked to ponder between the choice of f1 and f2, the pondering itself,
before a choice is made, is a cognitive context, and hence it changes in general the state of the DM entity.
Similarly, whenever a decision-maker is asked to ponder between the choice of f3 and f4, also this introduces
a cognitive context, before the choice is made – and a context which in general is different from the one
introduced by pondering about the choice between f1 and f2 – which will in general change the state of
the DM entity.
Let us now introduce a state p0 describing the situation where no cognitive context is present. This is
the initial state of the DM entity, and symmetry considerations suggest to represent it by the unit vector
|v0〉 = 1√3(1, 1, 1). Then, a pondering about the choice between f1 and f2 will make the state p0 of the DM
entity change to a state pw1 that is generally different from the state pw2 in which the DM entity changes
from p0 when pondering about a choice between f3 and f4.
Let us then come to the representation of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1, Section 2. For the utility
values u(0) and u(100), the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 are respectively represented by the Hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(100)PR + u(0)PY + u(0)PB (9)
Fˆ2 = u(0)PR + u(0)PY + u(100)PB (10)
Fˆ3 = u(100)PR + u(100)PY + u(0)PB (11)
Fˆ4 = u(0)PR + u(100)PY + u(100)PB (12)
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The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv of the DM entity are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = 1
3
u(100) +
2
3
u(0) (13)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(0) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(100) (14)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ3|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(100) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(0) (15)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = 1
3
u(0) +
2
3
u(100) (16)
We note that Wv(f1) and Wv(f4) do not depend on the state pv, as f1 and f4 are ‘ambiguity-free acts’,
while Wv(f2) and Wv(f3) do depend on pv. This means that it is possible to find a state pw1 such that
Ww1(f1) > Ww1(f2), and a state pw2 such that Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3). The states pw1 and pw2 reproduce
Ellsberg preferences, in agreement with an ambiguity aversion attitude.
We found in the Ellsberg three-color experiment presented in Section 3 that the preference weight of
participants preferring f1 over f2 was 0.815, and the preference weight of participants preferring f4 over
f3 was 0.780. A quantum model for these data can be constructed, for example, by finding two orthogonal
states pw1 and pw2 , represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉, respectively, such that
〈w1|Fˆ1 − Fˆ2|w1〉 = 0.815 (17)
〈w2|Fˆ4 − Fˆ3|w2〉 = 0.780 (18)
where Fˆi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, are defined in (9)–(12). Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, a risk averse
utility function u(x) =
√
x, hence u(0) = 0 and u(100) = 10. Then, in the canonical basis of C3, a solution
is
|w1〉 = (0.577, 0.644, 0.502) (19)
|w2〉 = (0.577, 0.505ei238.48◦ , 0.641ei120.46◦) (20)
We however notice that the solution is not unique.
The states pw1 and pw2 , represented by the unit vectors in (19) and (20), identify the subjective
probability distributions µw1 and µw2 , respectively, reproducing the ambiguity aversion pattern of the
experiment. According to µw1 , people estimate on average 37.3 yellow balls and 22.7 black balls, while
they estimate on average 23 yellow balls and 37 black balls according to µw2 . However, generally speaking,
preferences do depend on the state pv of the DM entity.
This completes the construction of a quantum representation of the Ellsberg three-color experiment in
Section 3, which follows the prescriptions in Section 4.
4.2 Application to the Machina paradox
The quantum-theoretic framework in Section 4 also allows straightforward modeling of the Machina 50/51
and reflection examples in Section 3, as we show below.
‘Machina 50/51 example’. The DM entity is the urn with 50 red or yellow balls and 51 black or green
balls, in both cases in unknown proportion. The DM entity is associated with the Hilbert space C4 over
complex numbers. We denote by (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1) the unit vectors of the
canonical basis of C4.
Let us now consider the mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events ER: “a red ball is drawn”,
EY : “a yellow ball is drawn”, EB: “a black ball is drawn”, and EG: “a green ball is drawn”. The events
Ei, i ∈ {R, Y,B,G} define a color measurement on the DM entity. This measurement has four outcomes
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corresponding to the four colors red, yellow, black and green, and it is represented by a Hermitian operator
with eigenvectors |R〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0), |B〉 = (0, 0, 1, 0) and |G〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1) or, equivalently,
by the spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i| | i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}}. Thus, the event Ei is represented by the orthogonal
projection operator Pi, i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}. In the canonical basis of C4, a generic state pv of the Machina
entity, which has a cognitive nature, is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 =
∑
i∈{R,Y,B,G}
ρie
iθi |i〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB , ρGeiθG) (21)
By using Born’s rule, we can write the probability µv(Ei) of drawing a ball of color i, when the DM entity
is in the state pv is given by
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (22)
for every i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}. The Machina 50/51 example requires that ρ2R + ρ2Y = 50101 and ρ2B + ρ2G = 51101 ,
which allows us to write (21) as
|v〉 = (ρReiθR ,
√
50
101
− ρ2ReiθY , ρBeiθB ,
√
51
101
− ρ2BeiθG) (23)
As in the Ellsberg case, we assume that the initial state p0 of the DM entity completely reflects
the initial information about the different colors. Thus, p0 is represented by the unit vector |v0〉 =
(
√
50
101 ,
√
50
101 ,
√
51
101 ,
√
51
101). Whenever the decision-maker is presented with the Machina 50/51 exam-
ple, her/his pondering about the choices to make gives rise to a cognitive context, which changes the state
of the DM entity from p0 to a generally different state pv, represented by the unit vector |v〉, as in (21).
Hence, the pondering about a choice between f1 and f2 will make the initial state p0 of the DM entity
change to a state pw1 that is generally different from the state pw2 in which the DM entity changes from
the initial state p0 in a pondering about the choice between f3 and f4.
Let us now represent the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 2, Section 2. For a given utility function u, we
respectively associate f1, f2, f3 and f4 with the Hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(202)(PR + PY ) + u(101)(PB + PG) (24)
Fˆ2 = u(202)(PR + PB) + u(101)(PY + PG) (25)
Fˆ3 = u(303)PR + u(202)PY + u(101)PB + u(0)PG (26)
Fˆ4 = u(303)PR + u(101)PY + u(202)PB + u(0)PG (27)
The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = 50
101
u(202) +
51
101
u(101) (28)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = u(202)ρ2R + u(101)ρ2y + u(202)ρ2B + u(101)ρ2G (29)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ3|v〉 = u(303)ρ2R + u(202)ρ2B + u(101)ρ2Y + u(0)ρ2G (30)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = u(303)ρ2R + u(101)ρ2B + u(202)ρ2Y + u(0)ρ2G (31)
We note that the expected utility in (28) does not depend on the state pv, while the expected utilities in
(29)–(31) do depend on pv, which expresses the fact that the act f1 is unambiguous, while f2, f3 and f4 are
ambiguous. This means that it is in principle possible to find two states pw1 and pw2 of the DM entity such
that Ww1(f1) > Ww1(f2) and Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3), in agreement with the Machina preferences n Section 2.
We finally represent the data collected on the Machina 50/51 example in Section 3. We found that the
preference weight of participants preferring f1 over f2 was 0.580, while the preference weight of participants
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preferring f4 over f3 was 0.630. To construct a quantum-theoretic model for these data, we need to find
two orthogonal states pw1 and pw2 , respectively represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉 of C4, such
that
〈w1|Fˆ1 − Fˆ2|w1〉 = 0.580 (32)
〈w2|Fˆ4 − Fˆ3|w2〉 = 0.630 (33)
where Fˆi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, are defined in (24)–(27). Assuming again a risk averse utility function u(x) =
√
x,
so that u(202) ≈ 14.213 and u(101) ≈ 10.050, we have that a solution of (32) and (33) is given by
|w1〉 = (0.487, 0.508, 0.345, 0.621ei90◦)
= (0.487, 0.508, 0.345, 0.62i) (34)
|w2〉 = (0.605ei90◦ , 0.359, 0.530ei180◦ , 0.474)
= (0.605i, 0.359,−0.530, 0.474) (35)
in the canonical basis of C4. We remind however that such a solution is not unique.
The states pw1 and pw2 represented in (34) and (35) identify the subjective probability distributions
µw1 and µw2 , respectively, reproducing the Machina preferences in the 50/51 experiment. Consider also
that preferences generally depend on the state pv of the DM entity.
This completes the construction of a quantum-theoretic model for the Machina 50/51 experiment, which
follows the prescriptions in Section 4.
‘Machina reflection example with lower tail shifts’. The DM entity is the urn with 10 red or yellow
balls and 10 black or green balls, in both cases in unknown proportion. A possible (cognitive) state pv of
the DM entity is represented by the unit vector |v〉 ∈ C4.
Let us consider again the elementary, exhaustive and mutually exclusive events Ei: “a ball of color i is
drawn”, i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}. They define a color measurement with four outcomes corresponding to the four
colors, and is represented by a Hermitian operator with eigenvectors |R〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0),
|B〉 = (0, 0, 1, 0) and |G〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1) or, equivalently, by the spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i| | i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}}.
Thus, the event Ei is represented by the orthogonal projection operator Pi, i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}. In the
canonical basis of C4, a state pv of the DM entity is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 =
∑
i∈{R,Y,B,G}
ρie
iθi |i〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB , ρGeiθG) (36)
The probability µv(Ei) of drawing a ball of color i, i ∈ {R, Y,B,G}, when the Machina entity is in a state
pv is given, through Born’s rule, by
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (37)
The reflection with lower tail shifts situation requires that ρ2R + ρ
2
Y = 1/2 = ρ
2
B + ρ
2
G. Hence, a state pv of
the DM entity is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = (ρReiθR ,
√
1
2
− ρ2ReiθY , ρBeiθB ,
√
1
2
− ρ2BeiθG) (38)
We suppose that the initial state p0 of the DM entity expresses the initial symmetry in the distribution
of colors, that is, p0 is represented by the unit vector |v0〉 = 12(1, 1, 1, 1). Whenever the decision-maker is
presented with the Machina paradox situation, her/his pondering about the choices to make gives rise to
a cognitive context, which changes the state of the DM entity from p0 to a generally different state pw,
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represented by the unit vector |w〉, as in (38). In this framework, the pondering about a choice between f1
and f2 will make the initial state p0 of the DM entity change to a state pw1 that is generally different from
the state pw2 in which the DM entity changes from the initial state p0 in a pondering about the choice
between f3 and f4.
Let us now represent the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 3, Section 2. For a given utility function u, we
respectively associate f1, f2, f3 and f4 with the Hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(0)PR + u(50)PY + u(25)PB + u(25)PG (39)
Fˆ2 = u(0)PR + u(25)PY + u(50)PB + u(25)PG (40)
Fˆ3 = u(25)PR + u(50)PY + u(25)PB + u(0)PG (41)
Fˆ4 = u(25)PR + u(25)PY + u(50)PB + u(0)PG (42)
The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = u(0)ρ2R + u(50)ρ2Y +
1
2
u(25) (43)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = u(0)ρ2R + u(25)ρ2Y + u(50)ρ2B + u(25)ρ2G (44)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = u(25)ρ2R + u(50)ρ2Y + u(25)ρ2B + u(0)ρ2G (45)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = 1
2
u(25) + u(50)ρ2B + u(0)ρ
2
G (46)
All expected utilities depend on the state pv in this case, hence it is possible to find a state pw1 such that
Ww1(f1) > Ww1(f2), and a state pw2 such that Ww2(f3) > Ww2(f4), in agreement with the findings on the
reflection example with lower tail shifts (Section 3). We found that the preference weight of participants
preferring f1 over f2 was 0.575, and the preference weight of participants preferring f3 over f4 was 0.550.
A quantum mechanical model for the experimental data above can be constructed by finding two
orthogonal states pw1 and pw2 , represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉, respectively, such that
〈w1|Fˆ1 − Fˆ2|w1〉 = 0.575 (47)
〈w2|Fˆ3 − Fˆ4|w2〉 = 0.550 (48)
where Fˆi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, are defined in (39)–(42). We assume again the risk averse utility u(x) =
√
x, so
that u(50) =
√
50 ≈ 7.071 and u(25) = √25 = 5. Then, in the canonical basis of C4, a solution is given by
|w1〉 = (0.333, 0.624, 0.333, 0.624) (49)
|w2〉 = (0.342ei180◦ , 0.619ei270◦ , 0.342, 0.619ei90◦)
= (−0.342,−0.619i, 0.342, 0.619i) (50)
Also in this case, the solution is not unique.
The states pw1 and pw2 represented in (49) and (50) identify the subjective probability distributions
µw1 and µw2 , respectively, reproducing the experimental pattern. But, generally speaking, preferences do
depend on the state pv of the DM entity.
This completes the construction of a quantum model for the Machina reflection experiment with lower
tail shifts, which follows the prescriptions in Section 4.
‘Machina reflection example with upper tail shifts’. The quantum-theoretic model is the same as the
one constructed for the reflection example with lower tail shifts. The states pw1 and pw2 reproducing the
preference weights 0.670 for f1 over f2 and 0.520 for f3 over f4 are respectively represented by the unit
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vectors
|w1〉 = (0.297, 0.642, 0.297, 0.642) (51)
|w2〉 = (0.353, 0.613ei90◦ , 0.353ei180◦ , 0.613ei270◦)
= (0.353, 0.613i,−0.353,−0.613i) (52)
for an utility value u(50)− u(25) = √50−√25 ≈ 2.0711, which completes the quantum representation of
the Machina reflection experiment with upper tail shifts.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we tested the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations in a decision-making experiment with
human participants. The Ellsberg three-color experiment confirmed the typical ambiguity aversion pattern
that is known in the literature, and the Machina 50/51 experiment confirmed the typical preferences
suggested by Machina, against the predictions of SEUT and its major non-expected utility extensions.
The Machina reflection experiments instead revealed a behavior that is not sensible to the informational
symmetry suggested by Machina, which is compatible with the predictions of rank-dependent utility models,
like Choquet expected utility.
We then showed that a quantum-theoretic framework developed by some of us (Aerts et al. 2017)
enables modeling of various decision-making situations in presence of uncertainty, and allows faithful rep-
resentation of the experiments above. This framework can be seen as the first step toward the development
of a quantum-based state-dependent EUT.
We conclude this paper with some considerations on the ‘event-separability property’ stated by SEUT
through the sure-thing principle and partially retained by some of its extensions, like Choquet expected
utility. According to Machina (Machina 2009), the difficulties of SEUT to reproduce human decisions
in Ellsberg-type scenarios stem from the event-separability property entailed by the sure-thing principle.
Similarly, the difficulties of rank-dependent utility models, like Choquet expected utility, may be due to
the ‘tail-separability property’ entailed by its axiomatics. Indeed, the sure-thing principle states that
preferences are separable across mutually exclusive events. A partial form of event-separability is retained
by rank-dependent utility models, and formalized in a ‘comonotonic sure-thing principle’ and the ensuing
tail-separability. This does not instead occur in the quantum-theoretic framework, where preferences
between acts are always connected through the state of the DM entity via (5). The latter state also
connects the mutually exclusive events, determining their subjective probabilities via (2). Hence, one
cannot assume separability of acts across mutually exclusive events in the quantum-theoretic framework.
This ‘non-separability property’ might be responsible of the flexibility of the quantum-theoretic framework
to accomodate human decisions in presence of ambiguity, in agreement with Machina’s considerations.
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A Essential quantum mathematics
We present in this appendix the essential definitions and results of the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory that are needed to represent DM entities and are useful to grasp the results attained in Section 4.
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Our presentation will avoid superfluous technicalities, while aiming to be synthetic and rigorous.
When the quantum mechanical formalism is applied for modeling purposes, each considered entity – in
our case a cognitive entity – is associated with a complex Hilbert space H, that is, a vector space over the
field C of complex numbers, equipped with an inner product 〈·|·〉 that maps two vectors 〈A| and |B〉 onto
a complex number 〈A|B〉. We denote vectors by using the bra-ket notation introduced by Paul Adrien
Dirac, one of the pioneers of quantum theory (Dirac 1958). Vectors can be ‘kets’, denoted by |A〉, |B〉, or
‘bras’, denoted by 〈A|, 〈B|. The inner product between the ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉, or the bra-vectors 〈A|
and 〈B|, is realized by juxtaposing the bra vector 〈A| and the ket vector |B〉, and 〈A|B〉 is also called a
‘bra-ket’, and it satisfies the following properties:
(i) 〈A|A〉 ≥ 0;
(ii) 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉∗, where 〈B|A〉∗ is the complex conjugate of 〈A|B〉;
(iii) 〈A|(z|B〉 + t|C〉) = z〈A|B〉 + t〈A|C〉, for z, t ∈ C, where the sum vector z|B〉 + t|C〉 is called a
‘superposition’ of vectors |B〉 and |C〉 in the quantum jargon.
From (ii) and (iii) follows that the inner product 〈·|·〉 is linear in the ket and anti-linear in the bra, i.e.
(z〈A|+ t〈B|)|C〉 = z∗〈A|C〉+ t∗〈B|C〉.
We recall that the ‘absolute value’ of a complex number is defined as the square root of the product of
this complex number times its complex conjugate, that is, |z| = √z∗z. Moreover, a complex number z can
either be decomposed into its cartesian form z = x+iy, or into its polar form z = |z|eiθ = |z|(cos θ+i sin θ).
As a consequence, we have |〈A|B〉| = √〈A|B〉〈B|A〉. We define the ‘length’ of a ket (bra) vector |A〉 (〈A|)
as |||A〉|| = ||〈A||| = √〈A|A〉. A vector of unitary length is called a ‘unit vector’. We say that the ket
vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are ‘orthogonal’ and write |A〉 ⊥ |B〉 if 〈A|B〉 = 0.
We have now introduced the necessary mathematics to state the first modeling rule of quantum theory,
as follows.
First quantum modeling rule: A state A of an entity – in our case a cognitive entity – modeled by quantum
theory is represented by a ket vector |A〉 with length 1, that is 〈A|A〉 = 1.
An orthogonal projection M is a linear operator on the Hilbert space, that is, a mapping M : H →
H, |A〉 7→ M |A〉 which is Hermitian and idempotent. The latter means that, for every |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and
z, t ∈ C, we have:
(i) M(z|A〉+ t|B〉) = zM |A〉+ tM |B〉 (linearity);
(ii) 〈A|M |B〉 = 〈B|M |A〉∗ (hermiticity);
(iii) M ·M = M (idempotency).
The identity operator 1 maps each vector onto itself and is a trivial orthogonal projection operator.
We say that two orthogonal projections Mk and Ml are orthogonal operators if each vector contained in
the range Mk(H) is orthogonal to each vector contained in the range Ml(H), and we write Mk ⊥ Ml, in
this case. The orthogonality of the projection operators Mk and Ml can also be expressed by MkMl = 0,
where 0 is the null operator. A set of orthogonal projection operators {Mk | k ∈ {1, . . . , n}} is called a
‘spectral family’ if all projectors are mutually orthogonal, that is, Mk ⊥Ml for k 6= l, and their sum is the
identity, that is,
∑n
k=1Mk = 1. A spectral family {Mk | k = 1, . . . , n} identifies an Hermitian operator
Oˆ =
∑n
i=1 okMk, where ok is called ‘eigenvalue of Oˆ’, i.e. is a solution of the equation Oˆ|o〉 = ok|o〉 – the
non-null vectors satisfying this equation are called ‘eigenvectors of Oˆ’.
The above definitions give us the necessary mathematics to state the second modeling rule of quantum
theory, as follows.
Second quantum modeling rule: A measurable quantity Q of an entity – in our case a cognitive entity –
modeled by quantum theory, and having a set of possible real values {q1, . . . , qn} is represented by a spectral
family {Mk | k = 1, . . . , n}, equivalently, by the Hermitian operator Qˆ =
∑n
k=1 qkMk, in the following way.
If the conceptual entity is in a state represented by the vector |A〉, then the probability of obtaining the
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value qk in a measurement of the measurable quantity Q is 〈A|Mk|A〉 = ||Mk|A〉||2. This formula is called
the ‘Born rule’ in the quantum jargon. Moreover, if the value qk is actually obtained in the measurement,
then the initial state is changed into a state represented by the vector
|Ak〉 = Mk|A〉||Mk|A〉|| (53)
This change of state is called ‘collapse’ in the quantum jargon.
Let us now come to the formalization of quantum probability. A major structural difference between
classical probability theory, which satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorov, and quantum probability theory,
which is non-Kolmogorovian, relies on the fact that the former is defined on a Boolean σ-algebra of events,
whilst the latter is defined on a more general algebraic structure (Pitowsky 1989). More specifically,
let us denote by L (H) the set of all orthogonal projection operators over the complex Hilbert space H.
L (H) has the algebraic properties of a complete orthocomplemented lattice, but L (H) is not distributive,
hence L (H) does not form a σ-algebra. A ‘generalized probability measure’ over L (H) is a function
µ : M ∈ L (H) 7−→ µ(M) ∈ [0, 1], such that µ(1) = 1, and µ(∑∞k=1Mk) = ∑∞k=1 µ(Mk), for any countable
sequence {Mk ∈ L (H) | k ∈ {1, 2, . . .}} of mutually orthogonal projection operators. The elements of
L (H) are said to represent ‘events’, in this framework. Referring to the definitions above, the event “a
measurement of the quantity Q gives the outcome qk” is represented by the orthogonal projection operator
Mk.
Born’s rule establishes a connection between states and generalized probability measures, as follows.
Given a state of a cognitive entity represented by the vector |A〉 ∈ H with length 1, it is possible to
associate |A〉 with a generalized probability measure µA over L (H), such that, for every M ∈ L (H),
µA(M) = 〈A|M |A〉. The generalized probability measure µA is a ‘quantum probability measure’ over
L (H). Interestingly enough, if the dimension of the Hilbert space is greater than 3, all generalized
probability measures over L (H) can be written as functions µA(M) = 〈A|M |A〉, for some unit vector
|A〉 ∈ H. This is the content of the Gleason theorem (Gleason 1957).
The quantum theoretical modeling above can be extended by adding further quantum rules to model
compound cognitive entities and more general classes of measurements on cognitive entities. However, the
present definitions and results are sufficient to attain the results in this paper.
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